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Abstract—This paper introduces a computational tool to help
assessing the impact of regulation policies within distribution
networks in the deployment of distributed renewable electricity
generation. This tool is a comprehensive multi-agent simulator
capable of handling the interaction between the users of a
distribution network and their distribution system operator. With
this simulator, it is possible to address the different regulatory
constraints encountered by distribution system operators, for
any regulation policy. In the simulator, we model individual
electricity consumers as rational agents, that may invest in
optimised distributed renewable energy installations, if they are
cost-efficient compared to the network tariff. By modelling the
cost recovery scheme of the distribution system operator, the
simulator then computes the evolution of the network tariff in
response to a change of the consumption and generation of the
consumers in the distribution network, due to the deployment of
distributed generation. The simulator is illustrated with various
regulation policies.
Index Terms—Distribution networks, tarification, distributed
generation, optimisation, power system economics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decades, proactive policy making and nu-
merous incentive schemes have supported a major paradigm
shift in the power generation sector, resulting in a progres-
sive transition from fossil fuels to renewable sources [1]. In
Europe, the European Parliament Directive 2009/28/EC, urges
the integration of renewable energy sources (RES) to reduce
fossil fuel dependency, and in particular to attain by 2020 a
20% share of Europe gross final energy consumption from
renewable sources [2]. This transformation of the electricity
generation paradigm towards RES integration, entails a switch
from centralised conventional generation, to (decentralised)
distributed renewable energy (DRE) generation [3]. To inte-
grate DRE into the electricity mix, for instance in the form
of solar photovoltaic (PV), regulatory mechanisms such as
subsidies, play a major role, in view of the fact that these
technologies are, up to a point, less economically competitive
than traditional ones [4].
Several obstacles stem from the aforementioned decentra-
lisation of the electricity generation, and impose constraints
on the electricity distribution system [5]. Two categories of
constraints might be considered: technical, and regulatory
[6]. On the one hand, technical constraints range from the
need to develop and install new meters recording/monitoring
electricity consumption and production in real time (smart
meters), to devising appropriate control strategies to deal with
under and over-voltages that may occur in the low voltage
(LV) distribution system due to substantial power injections
in LV feeders. On the other hand, regulatory constraints,
often deemed less critical by the engineering community, may
however be key for the satisfactory and effective integration
of DRE into the system. They are multifaceted and encompass
notably electricity pricing, support schemes for DRE integra-
tion, and compensation mechanisms. All of these factors may
affect the financial sustainability of the distribution network
companies operating in a context of heavy DRE integration.
The aim of this paper is to address these regulatory challenges
by formalising a model that enable evaluating their impact on
the distribution networks.
A common approach adopted in the literature to study
and assess the effectiveness of regulatory schemes is to look
at them from the viewpoint of the customers connected to
the distribution network. For example in [7, 8], different
tariff structure designs are proposed and their impact on the
customer bill is assessed. In [9, 10], the researchers investigate
various methodologies to quantify the transmission component
of the electricity costs. A more comprehensive analysis may
be found in [11, 12]. In these two studies, the authors per-
form a complete study of different wholesale market designs,
tariff structure designs, and compensation mechanisms. They
explore the impact each of these aspects may have on the bills
of the DRE owners of a distribution network (DN). From all
these works, it appears that, whilst the customer perspective
has been extensively explored, there exists a theoretical gap in
the treatment of the interaction between customers and DN,
and more precisely in the way the regulatory framework in
place impacts those interactions. Thus, in our work we aim to
develop a comprehensive simulator capable of handling cus-
tomers/DN operator interactions and testing various policies
addressing regulatory constraints encountered by distribution
system operators (DSOs) in the context of extensive DRE
integration.
To illustrate such regulatory constraints, let us consider as
an example the case of a DN tarification design, where the cost
recovery scheme of the DSO is based on the net energy off-
take of customers. Provided that DRE owners self-consume
part of their needs, the deployment of DRE installations may
induce a reduction in the net energy drawn from the DN.
Hence, in a constant overall electricity demand context, if
DRE installations are deployed, the net energy consumption
of the DN will decrease. Consequently, the utility’s revenues
will shrink, and might not be sufficient to cover its costs of
operation and required investment in the DN (break even),
forcing the utility to raise prices. If this phenomenon goes on
unchecked for some time, a “death spiral” (i.e. an uncontrolled
increase in electricity prices) may appear [13], in which the
extra financial burden resulting from higher electricity prices
is mostly incurred by non DRE owners, who are more exposed
to prices. In this example, due to the regulation in force
incentivising DRE deployment, the financial sustainability of
both the distribution network company and the users, may be
jeopardised. The distributor might not be able to cover costs,
and the customers are exposed to increasing electricity prices.
To address these issues, this paper proposes a multi-agent
tool capable of assessing different regulatory scenarios. More
precisely, we focus on the study of two key aspects of regula-
tion: (i) the support schemes, and (ii) the compensation mech-
anisms. The first deals with the economic support dedicated
to foster DRE integration. The second consists in establishing
how the consumption and the production of electricity are
recorded and charged to the customers. This tool allows to
explore how these two elements impact the integration of DRE
into the electricity mix, as well as the evolution of network
prices as a result of a change in the composition of the DN.
Our work is developed as follows:
• We build a multi-agent tool to model DRE owners, non
DRE owners, and DSO. See Section II. In this model:
– We propose to represent individual users as rational
agents, that may invest in optimised DRE installations,
if they are cost-efficient compared to the network tariff.
This is further elaborated in Section III-A.
– We suggest a DN economic simulator by representing
the cost recovery mechanism of the DSO. This is
explained in Section III-B.
– We provide the framework to evaluate different re-
gulatory policies by means of a model of interaction
between the users and the DN. The evaluation consists
in the observation of how regulation and pricing affect
the integration of DRE, and how the deployment of
DRE impacts the evolution of the network prices of a
DN. This can be found in Section III-C.
• We test the tool using the current situation in the Walloon
region of Belgium as example. (Section IV).
The code of our simulator is available on GitHub1.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The main idea of this paper is to develop a simulator
to evaluate: (1) the impact of regulation and pricing on
the rate of adoption of DRE, and (2) the impact of DRE
penetration upstream in the distribution system. To simplify
the problem, we consider only one possible type of DRE
setup: an installation comprised of a PV array and/or batteries.
The distribution system is simulated from the standpoint of a
1 https://github.com/manueldevillena/tariff simulator
DSO, which provides the distribution service, and must break
even. The authors acknowledge that establishing the allowed
revenue for the DSO, is the subject of debate and has been
extensively addressed in the literature, see for example [14];
such considerations, though, are out of the scope of this work.
Thus, we simplify our problem by allowing a revenue which
is proportional to the energy off-take of customers. Finally, to
link the users and the DN, we make use of the distribution
component of the network tariff, which corresponds to the
price customers pay for their LV grid use.
The described simulator can be decomposed in two main
components: one that represents the users, and another that
represents the DN. Ultimately, the interplay between the two
components controls the evolution of DRE and DN.
1) DRE simulator: to simulate the potential DRE owners,
we produce a model that represents the DRE operation and
costs, making use of an optimisation framework to build it.
The key inputs of such model are the consumption profile
and the production profile of the DRE installations, and the
network tariff. This optimisation minimises the levelised cost
of electricity (LCOE) of the DRE installation.
2) DN simulator: the simulation of the DN is performed
by representing the cost recovery scheme of the DSO that
operates it. This recovery scheme is based on projected costs
and projected revenues of the DSO, over a given period. Then,
upon completion of that period, if the projected costs and
revenues do not cancel each other out, an imbalance appears. If
this is the case, the imbalance will be added to the calculation
of the distribution tariff for the next period, thus changing the
distribution price and therefore the network tariff.
These two components are linked by means of a model of
interaction which uses a price signal in a dynamic loop. The
price signal is used by the DRE simulator, which performs an
optimisation of every potential DRE installation in the system,
yielding the LCOE of each one for that price signal. Then,
the difference between the individually computed LCOE, and
the network tariff, is determined as a price gap. Such price
gap drives the deployment (or not) of DRE installations. The
DN simulator estimates the projected demand and costs for
the next period, accounting for the amount of DRE deployed
in the system during the previous period; at the same time,
it determines the actual revenues obtained from the previous
period. With the projected costs and the actual revenues of the
same period, the imbalance is calculated, and the distribution
price is adjusted accordingly.
III. PROBLEM FORMALIZATION
A. Optimising DRE installations
The goal of this section is to describe a method to size DRE
installations so that the associated LCOE is minimised over a
given period of time. This method relies on an optimisation
framework instantiated in the form of a linear program. The
optimisation horizon is set to Y ∈ N years, which are divided
in 8760 time-steps (Y × 8760):
• T = {0, . . . , T − 1}, with T = 8760, represents a time
discretisation of one year (in hours).
• Y = {0, . . . , Y − 1}, represents the years of the optimi-
sation.
The linear program requires several parameters as inputs.
Let G denote a tuple gathering these inputs:
G = (P,Π, F,H,U) ∈ G, with (1)
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corresponds to the price of PV
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represents the electricity prices.
Π(in) is the network tariff at which the users buy the
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defines the battery parame-
ters: efficiency of charging (η(c)), efficiency of discharge
(η(d)), depth of discharge (dod), and battery lifetime in
years (B).








represents the user consumption profile U (d)t (in terms
of hourly energy consumption), and production profile
U
(p)
t (in kW produced per kWp installed). The latter only
applies for DRE installations.
Let us introduce the variables of the optimisation problem.
Let A =
{
(p, b) |p ∈ [0, p¯] ; b ∈ [0, b¯]} denote the space of
sizing variables containing: PV size (p) in kWp and battery
size (b) in kWh. Then, let i0 represent the investment costs as
a function χ0, which is a mapping from (A× G) to R. We
assume a linear growth of the investment costs according to
the sizing variables A.
i0 = χ0 (A,G) =
(
p · P (pv) + Y
B
· b · P (bat)
)
(2)
The yearly costs of operation are represented by ξy . To com-
pute them, we resort to different equations, depending on the
compensation mechanism used. In our work two mechanisms
are considered: net-metering (NM) and net-purchasing (NP):
a) NM: the imports and the exports of a DRE are
recorded with a single meter, that runs forwards when im-
porting electricity and backwards when exporting electricity.
In practice this supposes that the electricity exported is paid
at the same price as the electricity consumed (network tariff).
At the end of a billing period, the balance is evaluated, and
the customers pay for the difference between imports and
exports. However, if the meter features a negative balance
(i.e. more exports than imports), the excess is not paid to
the customer. The resulting total yearly costs within this
compensation mechanism framework depend on the electricity
costs cNMy , and the operation and maintenance costs my:
ξNMy = c
NM
y +my ∀y ∈ Y (3)
b) NP: two distinct meters are associated to two different
prices. The first one records imports which are paid at network
tariff. The second records exports which are remunerated at
a different price. With this mechanism, there is no upper
bound to the amount of electricity the DRE owner may
sell. The resulting total yearly costs within this compensation
mechanism framework, depend on the electricity costs cNPy ,
the operation and maintenance costs my , and the revenues vy:
ξNPy = c
NP
y +my − vy ∀y ∈ Y (4)
Determining the electricity costs requires information about
the volumes of electricity imported and exported from and to
the grid, at every time step t. Let ρ(−)t denote the volume
of electricity imported from the grid, and ρ(+)t the volume



















t ·Π(in) ∀y ∈ Y (6)
The operation and maintenance costs can be represented as
a function χm that maps A→ R. Its computation is the same
for both compensation mechanisms. It is assumed to depend
linearly on the sizing variables A [15]:





· b ∀y ∈ Y (7)
As seen in equation (5), in the electricity cost computation
of NM, the revenues are subtracted from the costs. Thus,
to obtain an equivalent electricity cost for NP, the revenues
must be computed and subtracted from the costs as well. The






t ·Π(out) ∀y ∈ Y (8)
The energy balance of the system depends on the imports
ρ
(−)
t , exports ρ
(+)
t , the electricity produced by the PV array kt,
the demand U (d)t , the maximum production (kW/kWp) U
(p)
t ,
the energy flow into the battery j(−)t , and the energy flow
out of the battery j(+)t . The flows into and out of the battery
depend also on the variation of the state of charge between
t − 1 and t (soct − soct−1). Thus, the following equations
control the energy balance, taking into account the state of
charge of the batteries:
ρ
(+)
t − ρ(−)t = kt − U (d)t − j(−)t + j(+)t ∀t ∈ T, (9)
with:
kt = p · U (p)t ∀t ∈ T (10)
j
(−)
t ≤ b · F (−) ∀t ∈ T (11)
j
(+)
t ≤ b · F (+) ∀t ∈ T (12)









t · η(c) ∀t ∈ T \ {0}
soc0 ∈ [b · dod, b] for t = 0
(14)
Let LCOE denote the general objective function that
represents the levelised cost of electricity. This objective
function is a mapping from (G×A) to R. For a given pair











where the yearly demand of the system is defined as dy =∑T−1
t=0 U
(d)
t , r represents the discount rate factor, and µy
stands for the potential yearly subsidy (quota) the user may
receive (depending on the regulation). We define L̂COEG as






Furthermore, for every G ∈ G, there is at least one
configuration A∗ ∈ A that leads to the minimum LCOE:




To represent the diversity of customers within a DN, we
introduce a set of I ∈ N users {G1, . . . , GI} ⊂ G. Each user
Gi is characterised by specific consumption and production









∈ R+(2×T ) ∀i ∈ I, with I = {1, . . . , I}.
Consequently, one has:
Gi = (P,Π, F,H,Ui) ∈ G (18)
Following equations (16) and (17), each user Gi is associ-
ated with a minimal LCOE value L̂COEGi , and an optimal




LCOE (Gi, A) (19)
A∗Gi ∈ arg min
A ∈ A
s.t.(2) − (14)
LCOE (Gi, A) (20)
B. Simulating the evolution of the network tariff
The prevailing manner of calculating distribution tariffs
requires three elements for every tarification period: the esti-
mation of costs, the estimation of total demand, and the imbal-
ance between the estimated revenues recovered and the actual
revenues recovered from the previous period. We introduce
the concept of tarification period as the time between two
different distribution tariffs updates. Let us define a discrete
time variable n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} associated with tarification
periods. Some characteristics of the users may evolve with n.
Thus, we can define an n varying user tuple as:
Gi,n = (Pn,Πn, F,H,Ui) (21)
In this work, for the sake of simplification, we assign a one
year period to a given tariff, though it can be adjusted to a
different time-frame. At every year n, we compute the distri-
bution tariff Π(dis)n and, as such, an associated network tariff
Π
(in)
n . Then, given a network tariff Π
(in)
n , and maintaining
constant the inputs of the system Gi,n, a fraction of the users
of the DN might decide to deploy a DRE installation, which
will affect the total demand of the system. This deviation in the
generation paradigm of the DN, will induce a shift (typically
upwards) of the distribution price Π(dis)n+1 , and as such, the
network tariff Π(in)n . Furthermore, continuing in this loop,
a new network tariff Π(in)n+1 may cause an extra deployment
of DRE installations, creating a feedback loop that results in
a dynamic system indexed by n. This section is devoted to
explain the dynamics of such shifts in the distribution price.
Provided that the initial state n = 0 is balanced, it is
reasonable to assume that the costs incurred by the DSO
and the revenues recovered by it, are equal at this time:
R0 = C0. Furthermore, we will assume that the costs are
fixed (i.e. they remain constant over the entire simulation),
thus C0 = C. In addition, at time n = 0, the demand is
known, and is equal to the aggregated demand of all the
users of the DN. From this initial state, the simulation can
start by estimating the electricity demand at time n + 1. Let
D̂n+1 denote the estimation of the electricity demand at time
n + 1, this is computed by assuming that, in equilibrium
conditions, the demand will remain constant from n to n+ 1.
Thus, the estimated electricity demand may be determined as
a function of the total electricity off-take of the DN during
time n, denoted by ρ(−)n , and the total electricity demand
of the remaining users of the DN (who will never deploy a













t ∀n ∈ N \ {0} (23)
σn = σn−1, (24)
where σn is assumed to be constant over time. Note that D̂n+1
is a forecast calculated considering the consumption at time n.
With this forecast, the revenues that will be collected at time
n+ 1 can be estimated as a function of the estimated demand
D̂n+1 and the distribution price which is assumed to be the
same as in the previous period Π(dis)n :




n + λn ∀n ∈ N \ {0} (26)
where λn represents the costs of transmission, energy, and
taxes. We assume λn is constant over time.
At time n + 1, the actual revenues recovered by the DSO
can be computed as a function of the actual registered demand
Dn+1 and the distribution price Π
(dis)
n :
Rn+1 = Dn+1 ·Π(dis)n ∀n ∈ N \ {0} (27)
If the estimation of revenues and the actual revenues do
not match, an imbalance ∆n+1 emerges. This is computed
depending on the estimation of revenues at period n+ 1, and
the actual revenues at period n+ 1. Assuming the period has
already been realised, we change the indices from n+ 1 to n:
∆n = R̂n −Rn ∀n ∈ N \ {0} (28)
Finally, the distribution price for the following period Π(dis)n+1
is computed as a function of the costs for the DSO C, and the
total estimated electricity demand of the DN D̂n. Furthermore,
in order to offset the loss of revenues, the imbalance ∆n from






∀n ∈ N \ {0} (29)
where Π(dis)n+1 is transformed into Π
(in)
n+1 with of equation (26).
Equations (22) to (29) do not suffice to describe the com-
plete dynamics of the system, since they are not defined for
n = 0. Thus, the first step is initialised assuming a given
initial network tariff Π(in)0 (and as such, a Π
(dis)
0 ). Assuming
this initial state is in equilibrium (without initial imbalance),
the simulation can start by feeding this initial Π(in)0 to the DRE
simulator, which will lead to a change in the users composition
of the DN, and as such, an imbalance will emerge.
C. Model of Interaction
This element of the computational tool, uses the vector
L̂COEGi,n and the network tariff Π
(in)
n to simulate the
interaction between the different actors of the multi-agent
model. It necessitates the set of users of a DN who are
potential DRE owners (I).
For every potential DRE installation ∈ I, we can determine
a price gap Γi,n between the network tariff Π
(in)
n , and the
levelised cost of electricity L̂COEGi,n . We define this with a












∀i, n ∈ I×N
(30)
This price gap will take a value between 0 and 1, since
L̂COEGi,n cannot be greater than Π
(in)
n , due to optimality
constraints. To establish whether a DRE installation is de-
ployed or not, we make use of a Bernoulli random variable,
biased as a function of Γi,n, and a parameter α. With this
random variable we can model, for every potential DRE owner,
the decision of investing or not in a DRE installation of size
A∗Gi,n . Thus, we can extract a value βi from the resulting
Bernoulli distribution, ∀i, n ∈ I×N, as:
βi ∼ B(1, p); with, (31)
p = Γi,n · (1 + α) (32)
Then, the decision for every owner θi is given by:
θi = 1− βi ∀i, n ∈ I×N (33)
where θi = {0, 1}. If θi = 1, a DRE installation of size
A∗Gi,n is deployed. We assume that, for the simulation horizon
N , the users i may deploy a DRE installation once, meaning
that enlarging a deployed DRE is not permitted. Thus, when
a DRE installation of size A∗Gi,n is deployed, the user i is
prevented from investing in the future. If θi = 0, the simulation
continues, and another opportunity will be given to user i in the
following step n+ 1. At every time n, the process is repeated
for every potential DRE owners remaining.
D. Dynamics of the model of interaction
The dynamics of the overall system are characterised by
successive steps realised between n to n + 1, which are
decomposed as follows:
(i) Π(in)0 is assumed from a reference DN.
(ii) The DRE simulator is run to optimise the potential DRE
installations in a system, given such Π(in)0 . The sizing
configurations A∗Gi,n and the levelised costs of electricity
L̂COEGi,n are obtained.
(iii) Γi,n and θi are computed. The DRE installations corre-





emerges, caused by the DRE
installations that were not accounted for in the estima-
tion of revenues R0. The newly adopted DRE installa-





2 , . . . ,Π
(in)
N . The new network tariff is used
again in the optimisation and the process will continue
until the simulation horizon is reached, or the DRE
installations are not economically viable.
IV. TEST CASE
We test our computational tool with an example inspired
from the prevailing situation of the Walloon region of Bel-
gium: a system with net-metering and yearly quotas depending
on the size of the installation, as described in the programme
Qualiwatt, set in motion by the Walloon regulator CWAPE
[16]. This system establishes a yearly quota, calculated for a
3 kWp installation obtaining an internal rate of return of 6.5%
over 8 years. The quota (µy) is awarded during the first 5 years
of operation, and in practice represents between 291 and 444
e/year, depending on the DN of Wallonia. In this example we
use an average quota of 350 e/year during 5 years. The yearly
quota is awarded to DRE installations up to 10 kVA, on top
of the quotas, a NM compensation mechanism is allowed.
In addition, we test alternative policies introducing: (i) NM
without quotas; (ii) NP with quotas; (iii) NP without quotas.
(iv) NP with feed-in premium instead of quotas.
By keeping track of I and Π(in)n at every time step n we can
determine how the number of deployed DRE installations, and
the network tariff evolve over time. Performing this simulation
for different regulatory settings, might offer useful insights
when carrying out an impact assessment of those settings on
the evolution of the DN.
A. Definition of customers and other parameters
To represent every agent in the proposed multi-agent tool,
the model must include: (a) users who are potential DRE own-
ers, and (b) users who will never deploy such an installation.
a) Potential DRE owners: modelling the heterogeneity
of DN users involves the representation of every user as an
individual agent. To introduce them in the simulation, the
multi-agent model necessitates their electricity demand profile,
and their production profile. In the analysed test, we create
different synthetic demand profiles with the help of the CREST
model [17]. As for the production profile, we count on PV
measurements for Wallonia, expressed in kW/kWp, thus being
adaptable to any installation size.
b) Non potential DRE owners: the remaining customers
of the DN must be modelled only in terms of net energy off-
take. In the simulator, this term is introduced by σn in equation
(22). Typically this σn is useful to represent the potential for
DRE installations within the DN.
The simulator is initialised with the values G1,0, . . . , GI,0.
Parameters that evolve with n, are initialised with values
provided in Table I. Furthermore the value for α, Y , and r
are also included in this table.











Π(out) depends on each case [e/kWh]
F (in) 3 [-]









Technology prices evolve over time, to compute them we
resort to the following equation:
Pn = P0 +
n− 1
N − 1 · (PN−1 − P0) (34)
Different examples conform the conducted analysis, testing
two compensation mechanisms and two support schemes, and
illustrating the potential of the developed simulator. The two
explored options for compensation mechanisms are: NM and
NP (see Section III-A). The two types of support schemes
considered are: a quota system as previously explained and a
feed-in premium (FiP) which is added on top of the electricity
selling price. These examples are summarised in table II.
TABLE II: Specific inputs of the examples.
Ex. Support Comp. mechanism Π(out) [e/kWh]
(A) Quotas Net-metering (NM) 0.221
(B) None Net-metering (NM) 0.221
(C) Quotas Net-purchasing (NP) 0.042
(D) none Net-purchasing (NP) 0.042
(E) FiP Net-purchasing (NP) 0.04 + 0.04
1 With NM, the produced electricity is sold at retail price, but there is a
limit of volume, corresponding to the volume of electricity purchased
from the grid (i.e. the net balance imports minus exports must be at
least 0). This is a regulatory limit not a technical one, meaning that it
may be surpassed, but the export surplus will not be remunerated.
2 This price is lower than the network tariff, simulating a fixed wholesale
price. Further analyses may include a variable selling price, following
the wholesale market price variation.
B. Results
In this section we exhibit the results of plugging each of the
suggested examples of regulation policy, into the multi-agent
model developed in this paper, illustrating the potential of the
simulator. The impact of these examples is assessed by means
of two relevant outcomes:
(a) The deployment rate of DRE installations over n, illus-
trated in Figure 1;
(b) The evolution of the distribution price (expressed in terms
of network tariff, by using equation (26)) over the same
discrete time, represented in Figure 2.
From Figure 1 we can observe that all the regulatory
examples except for example (D), yield full DRE integration
over the given time horizon N (meaning that all the users from
set I have deployed a DRE installation). This indicates that the
business case for installing rooftop PV, considering 20 years
as the project lifetime, is positive from a purely economic
standpoint, using the configuration presented in Tables I and
II. Some relevant differences can be highlighted nonetheless,
related with the rate of DRE adoption. We observe that the
current regulation (A) is the fastest to achieve full DRE
integration, followed by (B), (E), (C), and finally (D). Note
that the rapid increase observed for examples (A), (B), and (E),
responds to an insufficient diversity of the users in I, which
are independent from the multi-agent simulator. Regardless
of this users sample, the comparison between the different
Figure 1: Evolution of the proportion of DRE owners over all
potential DRE owners (I) for different regulation policies.
examples can be conducted, provided that the set I is the
same for all of them. It is key to remark that the information
in Figure 1 does not relate with the size of the deployed
DRE installations, in practice this means that this figure is
not sufficient to determine whether a regulatory configuration
is efficient integrating renewable generation in the system
or not. Thus, in Table III the absolute amount of deployed
PV and battery is listed for each example, enabling a more
comprehensive assessment of the efficiency of the integration
of DRE into the electricity mix.
Figure 2: Evolution of the network tariff (Π(in)n ) for different
regulation policies.
Figure 2 shows how the distribution tariff, and with it, the
network tariff, evolves responding to a change in the composi-
tion of the distribution network (due to the deployment of DRE
installations). It showcases the potential of the simulator to
predict the evolution of network tariffs, anticipating the effects
of different regulatory configurations. Regarding the different
compensation mechanisms, some remarks can be noted:
a) NM: the net consumption registered by the DSO, is
the balance imports minus exports of the users. Thus, if a DRE
installation imports and exports the same volume of electricity,
the net consumption will be zero, and the DSO will not collect
revenues for the provided service, thus raising the distribution
tariff to offset the losses, and with it, the network tariff.
b) NP: the net consumption registered by the DSO, is
the net imports of the users, whose electricity bill will depend
only on the synchronization of the PV production with the
consumption.
These two different manners of charging the electricity, have
heavy implications on the optimal sizing configuration A∗Gi,n
of the users. In the first case (NM), the users have no incentive
to deploy storage from an economic perspective, since selling
electricity at network price when there is excess, and buying
it when there is need, result in the same net consumption as
storing the electricity and using it later. The latter though,
entails increasing the investment costs of the DRE installation.
In the second case (NP), the net consumption can only
be decreased by synchronizing production and consumption.
Since storage can be used to improve synchronization, the
users have economic incentives to install batteries, reducing
their electricity bill. Interestingly, the size of batteries to be
deployed, depend on the spread (difference between Π(in)n and
Π
(out)
n ). Thus, the lower the Π
(out)
n , and the higher the Π
(in)
n ,
the more batteries will be deployed. In the examples presented,
one can observe that in (C) and (D), both with NP and a selling
price of 0.04 e, the network tariff grows more than in example
(E), the reason for this lies in the battery size deployed, which
is larger for examples (C) and (D) (see Table III). This larger
battery size causes the DSO to sell less energy under these
conditions, and to raise the distribution tariff accordingly.
In table (III), we introduce the obtained L̂COEGi,n and
A∗Gi,n (with average (av.) values), which drive the evolution
of DRE integration and network tariff, for each example.
TABLE III: Examples main results.
Ex. L̂COE [e/kWh] Total p [kWp] Total b [kWh]
(A) 0.033 3,394 (av. 3.4) 0
(B) 0.051 3,390 (av. 3.4) 0
(C) 0.090 7,111 (av. 7.9) 3,379 (av. 8.4)
(D) 0.115 8,448 (av. 7.9) 3,407 (av. 8.3)
(E) 0.050 9,930 (av. 10) 1,572 (av. 5.9)
We observe that examples (A) and (B) exhibit a similar
behaviour. The impact of the yearly quota depends on the
expected lifetime of the project, in this case for a lifetime
Y = 20, the yearly quota does not have a large impact on
the economic viability of the project. A similar observation
can be extracted comparing examples (C) and (D), where
the effect of the yearly quota has a low impact on the DRE
installations, apart from reducing the L̂COEGi,n . Regarding
the support scheme consisting of a FiP of 0.04e on top of the
selling price (also 0.04e) example (E), one can observe that
the resulting L̂COEGi,n is similar to case (B), however, the
amount of solar photovoltaic, and batteries installed in the DN
is considerably greater in example (E). This indicates that, in
order to stimulate renewable integration, NP with FiP results
more effective than NM with yearly quotas. Furthermore, as
extracted from Figure 2, the final network tariff using the
configuration (E) is lower than using configurations (A) or
(B). The federal investment required for the quota system is
µy = 350e/year per user if y ≤ 5, and µy = 0 otherwise
(y > 5). As for the FiP, the federal investment required is the
annual amount of electricity exported (determined by the DRE
simulator in the optimisation) multiplied by the premium of
0.04e, which results in 440e/year per user.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the context of high penetration of decentralized electricity
generation, this paper sheds light on the policies and regulation
that might offer solutions to attain a 20% renewable energy as
set by the European directives 2009/23/EC. The main goal
of this work is to illustrate the modelling and functioning
of a prototype of a multi-agent model, built to test different
policies and regulations, and their effects downstream on the
installation of decentralized renewable generation. The main
remarks of our work are:
• We have modelled a multi-agent tool, in which different
agents are represented by means of an optimisation
framework (Section III-A), that interacts with the cost
recovery scheme of a DSO (Section III-B), by means of
a model of interaction (Section III-C). We have shown
that this tool is able to simulate, according to some inputs
G,α, and Y , and for a given regulatory conditions, the
evolution of a DN over time.
• We have illustrated the performance of such simulator
with several examples, starting with the current regulation
in the Walloon region of Belgium, and further explor-
ing different configurations. We compare two support
schemes (a yearly quota system and feed-in premium) and
two compensation mechanisms (net-metering and net-
purchasing). The results show that, for a project horizon
Y of 20 years, both compensation mechanisms achieve
full DRE integration. However, the trends are different,
and the underlying reasons for the DRE adoption is dif-
ferent. Whilst NM does not create the adequate conditions
for battery deployment, since with this compensation me-
chanism, the battery and the DN are perfect substitutes,
NP stimulates the deployment of batteries, since it is
through their use that the electricity bills of the users
may decrease.
• The analysed examples show that: (i) The current support
scheme as described in Qualiwatt may overcompensate
DRE owners, since only applying NM might be sufficient
support. (ii) The current compensation mechanism (NM)
may be cost-inefficient stimulating the adoption of solar
PV and batteries. (iii) An alternative to NM could be NP,
which induces a flatter growth in the network tariff. To
make NP a suitable alternative, a subsidy scheme based
on FiP is proposed in addition to it.
• Further investigation on alternative regulatory elements,
such as different tariff structures, may provide insight on
how to design the correct policies that will stimulate the
large-scale adoption of renewable generation. Moreover,
new computation techniques may help conduct the inves-
tigation at a higher level. Finally, improving the sample
of users, introducing different sub-groups of them, might
be helpful to improve the simulation outcome.
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